home
***
CD-ROM
|
disk
|
FTP
|
other
***
search
/
TIME: Almanac 1995
/
TIME Almanac 1995.iso
/
time
/
021389
/
02138900.028
< prev
next >
Wrap
Text File
|
1993-04-15
|
8KB
|
177 lines
<text id=89TT0433>
<link 93TG0022>
<link 93TG0021>
<link 93TG0020>
<link 89TT1491>
<title>
Feb. 13, 1989: More Reason For Hope Than Fear
</title>
<history>
TIME--The Weekly Newsmagazine--1989
Feb. 13, 1989 James Baker:The Velvet Hammer
</history>
<article>
<source>Time Magazine</source>
<hdr>
WORLD, Page 46
More Reason for Hope Than Fear
</hdr><body>
<p>Though the U.S. loses a diplomatic edge as the Soviets and
Chinese grow closer, Washington still has much to gain from the
new detente
</p>
<p>By Cyrus Vance and Richard C. Holbrooke
</p>
<p> If all goes well, the year's most spectacular photo
opportunity will present itself in May, when Mikhail Gorbachev
and Deng Xiaoping meet in Beijing. But this will be much more
than a photo-op. Such a summit would formally end an important
advantage enjoyed by the U.S. since Richard Nixon visited China
in 1972: Washington could talk to the leadership in both
Beijing and Moscow, but there was no high-level dialogue between
the Soviets and the Chinese and virtually no significant contact
at lower levels.
</p>
<p> Being able to speak to two sides while they cannot seriously
talk to each other is a tremendous plus in diplomacy. At times
some Washington officials sought to overplay "the China card,"
but the Chinese had a keen sense of how far to let things go.
In 1978 President Jimmy Carter established full diplomatic
relations between Washington and Beijing, putting the
relationship on a permanent, rather than personal, basis.
</p>
<p> The Nixon-Carter policies, ultimately endorsed by President
Reagan, had at least three major consequences. First, the
Chinese were drawn into constructive interaction with the other
nations along the Pacific Rim, thus ending a long period in
which the Chinese were regarded as dangerously destabilizing.
Second, America's strategic position, widely assumed to be
imperiled by the disastrous ending of its involvement in the
Viet Nam War, was unexpectedly enhanced. Finally, the new
relationship between China, the United States and Japan dealt a
diplomatic setback to the Soviet Union throughout the region.
</p>
<p> Nonetheless, the United States should not fear the ending of
its monopoly of Big Three summit dialogue. Sino-American
relations are now firmly based on mutual interests that go far
beyond a common attitude toward Moscow. Gorbachev and Deng will
not emerge from a summit ideologically reunified or recommitted
to joint support of subversion. In the Third World, Marxism has
lost its attractiveness as an ideology and an economic theory;
men calling themselves Marxists openly discuss what they can
learn from capitalist societies like South Korea. However, even
as the socialist economies liberalize, the fundamental
disagreements still exist between our democratic principles and
the Communist system.
</p>
<p> Gorbachev and Deng have the ability to reduce tensions
significantly in Asia. Two legacies of the past should be at the
top of their agenda. In both cases the U.S. can play an
important role.
</p>
<p> The Korean peninsula. For 20 years, Moscow and Beijing have
vied for the position of First Friend to North Korea -- each
trying to outdo the other in supporting its tyrannical leader,
Kim Il Sung, 76. The result has been that North Korea has been
under little or no pressure to moderate its attitude toward
South Korea. Given Kim Il Sung's desire to unify Korea under
his own brutal leadership, progress may be impossible until he
passes from the scene. But even Kim, a pure Stalinist, has
shown a willingness to open more lines of communication with
Seoul, and South Korean President Roh Tae Woo himself predicts
a North-South summit soon.
</p>
<p> The less the Soviet Union and China are forced, by their
rivalry, to support Kim's outdated myths, the more rapidly both
countries can develop valuable economic and political ties with
South Korea.
</p>
<p> Kampuchea. This is the most critical area in which Deng and
Gorbachev could make a contribution to peace. Since the
Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea a decade ago drove the Khmer
Rouge into enclaves along the border with Thailand, the country
has lived in a shadow world, no longer terrorized by Pol Pot
and his gang of murderers but still under foreign occupation,
with fighting continuing along the borders.
</p>
<p> Moscow and Beijing picked sides a long time ago. The Soviets
backed Hanoi and the pro-Vietnamese faction in Phnom Penh,
headed by Hun Sen, while China supported the Khmer Rouge.
Primarily for cosmetic reasons, even the Chinese finally
abandoned Pol Pot publicly, while continuing to support his
army.
</p>
<p> Frenetic diplomatic activity is now under way in at least
half a dozen capitals. In the wings, waiting to play yet another
dramatic scene on center stage, is Prince Sihanouk. Despite his
mercurial behavior, Sihanouk continues to personify his
nation-state to his own people and the world. He is essential
to any settlement.
</p>
<p> All this is encouraging, but a settlement in Kampuchea
requires the support of both Moscow and Beijing. The original
reasons for the Sino-Soviet rivalry in what was then termed
Cambodia have been overtaken by post-1970 internal changes in
the Soviet Union and China. If Moscow and Beijing agree to use
their influence to force both sides to deal with Sihanouk, then a
settlement becomes possible, given the great dependence of all
Kampuchean factions on outsiders.
</p>
<p> But there is a great danger: the Khmer Rouge must not be
given an opportunity to return to power in Kampuchea. Lately
much has been made of the idea that certain "senior leaders" of
the Khmer Rouge, including Pol Pot, must leave. But there is
also a distinct possibility, as Sihanouk himself has indicated,
that the Khmer Rouge might be permitted to retain a separate
military organization. And in addition, Khieu Samphan, the head
of the faction, would be allowed to participate in a coalition
government.
</p>
<p> The U.S. must oppose these concessions. Khieu Samphan is as
much an international outlaw as Pol Pot. If the Khmer Rouge is
permitted to remain armed, it would constitute an enormous
danger to Kampuchea. Given a chance, once the Vietnamese are
gone, the men of the killing fields would undoubtedly seek full
power again by whatever means available.
</p>
<p> The U.S. must play an active role if such a tragedy is to be
averted. It should not encourage or appear to sponsor any
settlement that allows the Khmer Rouge to return to Phnom Penh
as an organization inside a coalition.
</p>
<p> American policy under Carter and Reagan restored
Washington's influence in Asia and established a relatively
stable balance of power among the four major players in the
Pacific: the U.S., China, Japan and the Soviet Union. If
Gorbachev truly wishes to make the Soviet Union a participant in
the region's "economic miracle," as he has repeatedly said, he
should accept that balance of power as well as the American
naval presence, which is an important component of that
stability.
</p>
<p> Much would still remain to be done, notably resolving the
dispute between Japan and the Soviet Union over several small
islands in the Kurile chain, what the Japanese call the Northern
Territories, which have been controlled by the U.S.S.R. since
World War II. The Soviets should also open their far east much
more fully to foreign trade and visitors, and operate their own
Pacific fleet in a way that does not raise concern over Soviet
objectives.
</p>
<p> With one leader nearing the end of his historic era and the
other encumbered by domestic problems, there is some uncertainty
about the permanence of what Deng and Gorbachev decide. But in
foreign policy, these two men still talk with the greatest
authority. They have it in their power not only to end formally
a long period of hostility but also to make an enormous
contribution to peace. It may be too early to hail a new era in
Asia. But the good news is that an event that would have caused
waves of concern from New Delhi to Washington only a few years
ago will unfold this year in Beijing with much more reason for
hope than fear.
</p>
</body></article>
</text>